Problem of Evil

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What is the Problem of Evil?

The Problem of Evil is not a single argument but a family of challenges that question the logical or evidential compatibility between the existence of God (as traditionally conceived) and the existence of evil. The traditional concept of God includes three attributes: omnipotence (all-powerful), omniscience (all-knowing), and omnibenevolence (all-good). The problem arises because these three attributes, taken together, seem incompatible with the manifest existence of suffering, cruelty, and natural disasters. The classic formulation, attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, captures the tension in a logical trilemma:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?” — Epicurus (paraphrased by David Hume)

This is sometimes called the “logical problem of evil”—it claims that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically contradictory. A related but distinct challenge is the “evidential problem of evil”: even if not strictly contradictory, the sheer amount and intensity of suffering in the world makes God’s existence improbable.

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The Problem of Evil in 3 Depths

• Beginner: You notice the tension: a good parent wouldn’t let their child suffer preventable harm. Yet natural disasters and diseases cause immense suffering apparently without divine intervention. This intuitive conflict is the starting point.
• Practitioner: You distinguish logical vs. evidential formulations. Logical: is God + evil a contradiction? Evidential: does evil make God unlikely? You also separate “natural evil” (disease, earthquakes) from “moral evil” (human cruelty), as different theodicies address them differently.
• Advanced: You engage with technical debates: skeptical theism (we cannot know God’s reasons), free will defenses (moral agency requires libertarian freedom), soul-making theodicies (suffering builds character), and comparative assessments across worldviews.

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Origin

The Problem of Evil has ancient roots. Epicurus (341–270 BCE) articulated an early version in his lost work On the Gods, preserved through later citations. The problem reappeared in medieval Christian thought through thinkers like Augustine (354–430 CE), who developed influential responses centered on free will and the “privation” theory of evil (evil as absence of good, not a positive force). The modern formulation owes much to David Hume, who presented a powerful version in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). Hume’s character Philo argues that the mixture of good and evil in the world is more consistent with an indifferent or limited deity than with an all-powerful, all-good one. In the 20th century, the logical problem received rigorous treatment from philosopher J.L. Mackie (1917–1981), who claimed it constituted a formal disproof of theism. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense (1974) is widely regarded as showing that the logical problem can be answered—at least, that God and evil are not strictly contradictory—though the evidential problem remains contested.

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Key Points

The problem’s structure can be analyzed through several distinctions:

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Applications

Beyond theology, the Problem of Evil shapes thinking about ethics, suffering, and meaning:

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Case Study

Consider the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, which killed an estimated 30,000–50,000 people on a religious holiday. The disaster prompted widespread theological reflection across Europe. Voltaire famously attacked the optimistic theodicy of Leibniz—that this is “the best of all possible worlds”—in his satirical novel Candide (1759). The Lisbon earthquake illustrates several features of the Problem of Evil: it was natural (not caused by human wrongdoing), killed indiscriminately (including devout worshippers), and on a massive scale. Pre-modern theodicies emphasizing God’s particular purposes in individual cases struggled to account for such systematic destruction. The disaster contributed to the secularization of European thought and the development of disaster relief as a human, rather than divine, responsibility. Philosophically, the earthquake sharpened the evidential problem: it provided concrete data about the quantity and distribution of suffering that abstract philosophical arguments had to address. Subsequent theodicies, including process theology and various forms of skeptical theism, developed partly in response to such historical horrors.

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Boundaries and Failure Modes

Responses to the Problem of Evil face several common difficulties: The Instrumental Problem: Many theodicies treat suffering as instrumental to some greater good (soul-making, free will, etc.). Critics argue this instrumentalizes victims—using their pain as means to ends—and may fail to account for gratuitous suffering that seems to serve no redemptive purpose. The Modal Problem: If God is genuinely omnipotent, why couldn’t he achieve his good ends without evil? Free will defenses must explain why a world with free creatures who never choose evil is impossible, not just unlikely—a metaphysically demanding claim. The Empirical Problem: Even if the logical problem is solved, the evidential problem remains: given the sheer quantity of suffering, is theism probable? Skeptical theism—claiming we cannot know God’s reasons—risks undermining positive theological claims along with negative ones. The Existential Gap: Intellectual solutions may not address the experiential reality of suffering. The theoretical “answer” to the Problem of Evil and the pastoral response to a grieving person may be very different things.

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Common Misconceptions

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Related Concepts

The Problem of Evil intersects with multiple philosophical and theological themes:

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One-Line Takeaway